The Ontology of Many-Worlds: Modality and Time Essays -- Compare Contr

The Ontology of Many-Worlds Modality and fourth dimensionABSTRACT There are two types of theories regarding many worlds one is modal, maculation the other is temporal. The fountain regards globe as consisting of many possible worlds, while the last mentioned holds that reality consists of many momentary worlds, which are usually called moments. I compare these two theories, salaried close attention to the concept of transworld identity and compare trans-possible world identity with trans-momentary world identity (or transmoment identity). I characterize time from the point of many-worlds view, believing this to be one of the best ways of grasping the reality of time. First, I show that there is reason to adopt the many-worlds view because transworld identity is meaningful for both of them, while it is non for space. Second, I argue that transmoment identity is different from transpossible world identity concerning reality. The former is a realistic relation, while the latter is not. Thus, I find that the reality of time is in the relation of transmoment identity. Such a view, I contend, has merit on the basis that it recognizes the reality of time in a sense that is not true of space. IntroductionThere are two kinds of theories of many-worlds the one is modal and the other temporal. The former regards the reality as consisting of many possible worlds, while the latter as consisting of many momentary worlds, which usually are called moments. (1)In this paper I make a comparison between modal and temporal theories of many-worlds, curiously paying attention to the concept of transworld identity and so making a comparison between trans-possible-world identity and trans-momentary-world identity (or trans-moment identity abbreviately). (2... ... for the present argument.(5) Kaplans theory of prepare reference does not necessarily presuppose the ontology of many-worlds. So my critcism is not directed for his theory itself but for its application to the ontolo gical explanation of trans-moment identity.(6) This sentence is a tenuous modification of the example which Kaplan himself used. (Kaplan, D., 1989, p. 577, n.21)References(Kaplan, D., 1977) Demonseratives, in Themes from Kaplan, Almog, J. etc. ed., Oxford University Press, 1989, pp.481-563.(Kaplan, D., 1989) Afterthoughts, in Themes from Kaplan,pp.565-614.(Kripke, S.,1980) Naming and Necessity (2nd ed.), Basil Blackwell. (Lewis, D., 1986) On the Plurality of Worlds, Basil Blackwell.(McCall, S., 1994) A Model of the Universe, Oxford University Press.(McTaggart, J., 1908) The Unreality of Time, Mind 18, pp.457-484.